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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, Twitter discloses that it has
no parent corporation, nor is there a publicly held corporation that owns 10% or
more of its stock.
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RULE 35(B)(1) STATEMENT
The Panel’s dismissal of Twitter’s First Amendment retaliation claim split
from settled circuit precedent on two questions of exceptional importance.
First, under the guise of prudential ripeness, the Panel effectively added a new
requirement for First Amendment retaliation claims—innocence at the conclusion
of the retaliatory inquiry—that conflicts with multiple prior decisions defining the
elements of a retaliation claim. See, e.g., Bello-Reyes v. Gaynor, 985 F.3d 696, 702
(9th Cir. 2021).
Second, the Panel decision directly conflicts with Prager University v. Google
LLC, 951 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2020). Prager held statements by online content
moderators about the neutrality of their moderation policies non-actionable. The
Panel ignored Prager and held such common statements actionable “just like the
statements of any other business.”

1
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INTRODUCTION
The Panel (Bennett, Nelson, Bumatay, JJ.) improperly barred the courthouse
door to victims of retaliatory investigations, requiring them to suffer ongoing First
Amendment injury unless and until the retaliator decides to halt the unlawful inquiry.
Worse, the Panel (while purporting to eschew the merits of this case) reached out to
decide an important First Amendment question not addressed by the district court,
and in doing so erroneously licensed government censorship by investigation. En
banc consideration is necessary both to preserve consistency in this Court’s
decisions, and because the Panel’s decision raises issues of exceptional importance.
Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton launched an invasive investigation of
Twitter just days after Twitter made a First Amendment-protected decision with
which he disagreed: the permanent suspension of then-President Donald Trump’s
account. AG Paxton issued a CID demanding a broad swath of sensitive internal
documents regarding Twitter’s editorial decision-making writ large for the last five
years. ER127, 132. AG Paxton’s public statements confirmed his unlawful motives:
He expressly linked the investigation to Twitter’s decision to suspend Trump’s
account, vowed to “fight” Twitter with “all I’ve got,” and stated that his goal was to
“regulate” Twitter’s content-moderation decisions. ER126, 274.
The Constitution bars such official reprisals for the exercise of First
Amendment rights. Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1722 (2019) (“the First
2
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Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to
retaliatory actions for engaging in protected speech”). And AG Paxton’s threats and
retaliatory investigation are causing Twitter ongoing injury, pressuring it to conform
the content moderation decisions it must make every day to AG Paxton’s
preferences. Twitter sued for declaratory and injunctive relief.
The Panel dismissed the case as not “prudentially ripe,” concluding that
adjudicating Twitter’s retaliation claim would require determining whether Twitter
in fact had violated the Texas law on which AG Paxton purported to base his
investigation. Op. 10-11. And it held that determination should not be made before
AG Paxton had the opportunity to complete his investigation. Id. In other words,
the Panel ruled that if Twitter wants to challenge the lawfulness of AG Paxton’s
retaliatory investigation in federal court, it must wait until the investigation is
concluded and Twitter has been exonerated.
But that is backwards. A retaliation claim turns on the investigator’s unlawful
purpose at the moment he or she retaliates. The launching of the investigation itself
is the unlawful reprisal. A plaintiff who has suffered such reprisal after engaging in
First Amendment-protected expression is entitled to prompt relief. And to state a
claim, the plaintiff need only show that its protected conduct was a “substantial or
motivating factor” in the defendant’s adverse action, Pinard v. Clatskanie School
District 6J, 467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006). By resting its unripeness conclusion
3
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on the need to know the outcome of the investigation, the Panel effectively added a
new requirement to retaliatory investigation claims—innocence as determined at the
conclusion of the inquiry—in conflict with settled law.
The Panel’s holding, if left intact, would have wide-ranging consequences.
Because many investigations continue indefinitely, and because investigators
(especially those acting unlawfully) rarely inform their targets that an investigation
is complete, the Panel’s erroneous holding threatens to deprive individuals with
meritorious claims of government retaliation of any relief.

Victims of

unconstitutional investigations launched on the basis of other constitutionally
protected categories, such as race, religion, or sex, would face the same prudential
ripeness barrier, precluding them from stopping an unlawful investigation in its
tracks.
In reaching this conclusion, the Panel also unnecessarily reached and
erroneously decided an important First Amendment question not passed on below,
summarily holding that statements by content moderators about the neutrality of
their moderation policies may be investigated “just like the statements of any other
business.” Op. 13. That conclusion directly conflicts with this Court’s decision in
Prager University v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2020), that general
statements about neutrality in content moderation are “non-actionable.” Id. at 1000.
The Panel’s opinion never even mentions the squarely on-point Prager decision,
4
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instead justifying its sweeping conclusion with a single “cf.” cite to an inapposite
defamation case.
If left intact, the Panel’s holding that investigations of statements by an
information disseminator about the neutrality of its content moderation are on the
same footing as investigations of any ordinary commercial speech from any business
would be highly consequential. Editorial decision-making is at the core of what the
First Amendment protects, and newspapers, cable news channels, and online
platforms commonly describe their editorial policies as fair and neutral.
Government officials are frequently aggrieved at how they, or their messages, are
portrayed in these forums. It is all too easy for government officials to claim to be
investigating statements about neutrality, when what they really are seeking is to use
an investigation as a pressure point to induce more favorable coverage. That
concern—not present with ordinary inquiries relating to commercial speech—
demands more searching First Amendment scrutiny here.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Panel Opinion Creates Multiple Intra- And Inter-Circuit Splits
The Panel’s decision rests on two erroneous conclusions, both of which are

contrary to Ninth Circuit precedent, diverge from the conclusions of other courts of
appeals, raise issues of exceptional importance, and warrant correction by the en
banc Court.
5
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A.

The Viability Of A First Amendment Retaliation Claim Does Not
Turn On What The Retaliatory Investigation Ultimately Finds

In holding Twitter’s claim prudentially unripe, the Panel held that Twitter
cannot prevail on its First Amendment retaliation claim unless a court first concludes
that Twitter committed no actionable wrongdoing. Specifically, the Panel reasoned
that adjudicating Twitter’s retaliation claim “would require determining whether
Twitter has violated” the Texas law AG Paxton cited in issuing his demand for
documents. Op. 10. By the Panel’s lights, because AG Paxton’s investigation was
not yet complete, the case was “not yet fit for judicial decision.” Id.
That conclusion broke from settled precedent. A First Amendment retaliation
claim regarding an investigation does not turn on whether the investigation, if
allowed to proceed, would or could ultimately prove a violation of law. Instead, it
turns on whether the investigation was actually motivated by, and undertaken with
the intent to punish and deter, the plaintiff’s protected expression. See Bello-Reyes
v. Gaynor, 985 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 2021). An investigator that launches a
retaliatory investigation cannot transform the investigation into a lawful one simply
by uncovering some wrongdoing that might have theoretically motivated (but did
not in fact motivate) the investigation from the start.
To be sure, what the alleged retaliator knew or suspected about possible
wrongdoing by the target when he launched the investigation could be relevant in
assessing his or her motive. But assessing the alleged retaliator’s motive does not
6
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require “litigat[ing] [the] entire case on deceptive trade practices,” or assessing facts
not yet developed, as the Panel mistakenly held. Op. 10-11. It just requires
examination of what the retaliator said, did, and had in mind at the time of the
retaliation. Allen v. Iranon, 283 F.3d 1070, 1076-1077 (9th Cir. 2002) (liability turns
on knowledge at the time of retaliation); accord Keyser v. Sacramento City Unified
Sch. Dist., 265 F.3d 741, 750-751 (9th Cir. 2001); Ricciardi v. Bentley, 44 F. App’x
236, 238 (9th Cir. 2002) (evidence reflecting “information that was known to
[defendant] at the time of her allegedly retaliatory decisions … was admissible to
show [defendant’s] motive”). Nothing about the need to assess historical facts about
the defendant’s motives—a common feature of almost every lawsuit—could make
this or any other retaliatory investigation claim prudentially unripe.
Indeed, the Panel’s prudential unripeness determination rested on a mistaken
belief that a First Amendment retaliatory investigation claim requires not only a
retaliatory motive of the defendant, but also actual innocence of the plaintiff, as
determined after the conclusion of the investigation. Op. 11 (asserting that if
Twitter’s public statements characterizing its approach to content moderation were
found to be actionably misleading under Texas law, there would be “proper cause
for the investigation”).
But under settled precedent, a retaliation plaintiff like Twitter need show only
that “(1) [it] was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, (2) the defendant’s
7
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actions would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the
protected activity, and (3) the protected activity was a substantial or motivating
factor in the defendant’s conduct.” Pinard, 467 F.3d at 770. Whether Twitter in
fact unlawfully made false statements about its content moderation policies—the
topic AG Paxton now claims to be investigating—does not fall within any of these
elements. The truth of Twitter’s own statements about content moderation do not
bear on the first element. The activity Twitter plausibly alleges motivated AG
Paxton to retaliate, namely its editorial decision to suspend Trump’s account, is
protected by the First Amendment and cannot be retaliated against, without regard
to whether Twitter’s general statements about content moderation are true. Nor is
Twitter’s exoneration pertinent to the third element, because, as explained above,
that element turns on the investigator’s intent when commencing the alleged
retaliation, not on what might ultimately be discovered.
This Court recently reaffirmed this three-part standard for a retaliation claim.
Ballentine v. Tucker, No. 20-16805, 2022 WL 679084, at *4 (9th Cir. Mar. 8, 2022).
And the vast majority of circuits agree.1

See, e.g., Martin v. Duffy, 977 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir. 2020); Woodruff v. Mason,
542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008); Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 602 (6th Cir.
2002).

1
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Against the weight of this authority, the Panel cited no decision from this
Circuit—or any other—suggesting that a retaliation claim fails if the conduct of the
plaintiff that the defendant purports to be investigating can ultimately be shown to
have violated a state statute. 2 The Panel’s determination that prudential ripeness
requires governments be permitted to complete a retaliatory investigation, despite
well-pled allegations that the investigation was launched in retribution for, and is
intended to deter, protected speech, is directly contrary to this uniform body of
precedent. Grafting this additional requirement onto the long-standing test for First
Amendment retaliation thus creates both intra- and inter-circuit conflicts,
necessitating en banc review. Fed. R. App. P. 35(a)(1).
The consequences of the Panel’s rule, moreover, would be severe. If this
decision were left standing, plaintiffs with meritorious retaliation claims could not
seek relief in federal court until the investigation—the unlawfulness of which
The Panel’s rule is so out-of-step with precedent that AG Paxton did not propose
it, instead arguing that the plaintiff must prove the defendant lacked probable cause
to initiate the allegedly retaliatory investigation. See, e.g., Dist. Ct. Dkt. 38 at 1819; Resp. Br. 41-42. Requiring proof of a negative—that Twitter did not “violate[]
Texas’s unfair trade practices law,” Op. 10—would functionally impose an even
more burdensome standard. Regardless, the less-demanding rule AG Paxton
proposed also conflicts with this Court’s prior decisions, thereby further
undermining the Panel’s conclusion. See Skoog v. County of Clackamas, 469 F.3d
1221, 1235 (9th Cir. 2006) (plaintiff “need not have pled the absence of probable
cause in order to state a claim for retaliation” based on an investigatory search);
Bello-Reyes, 985 F.3d at 700-01 (declining to apply a “no probable cause standard”
outside of criminal prosecutions and the “closely related context of retaliatory
arrest[s]” (quotation marks omitted)).
9

2

Case: 21-15869, 03/30/2022, ID: 12409420, DktEntry: 57, Page 16 of 48

immutably turns on the investigator’s historical mindset when he launched it—is
complete. And because investigations have no definitive end-date—indeed AG
Paxton claims that his investigation of Twitter is still ongoing, without any
discernible action in the last year—the panel’s decision would erect a perpetual
prudential ripeness barrier, precluding plaintiffs with meritorious claims from
vindicating already-infringed rights indefinitely.3
Conversely, permitting plaintiffs to challenge ongoing investigations that, as
here, are plausibly alleged to violate the established test for First Amendment
retaliation will not “limit many legitimate investigations.” Op. 11. The Panel’s
proffered antitrust hypothetical misses the mark. An antitrust investigation can of
course be triggered by speech—e.g., a verbal agreement to fix prices. That raises no
retaliation issues because the speech triggering the inquiry is “speech integral to
criminal conduct,” which is not protected by the First Amendment. United States v.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). But an investigator cannot launch an antitrust
investigation against an individual because she criticized the investigator’s time in
The Panel minimized this concern, noting that Twitter could have sought to quash
the CID in state court. But this is an action under Section 1983, the whole purpose
of which is to provide a federal forum when constitutional rights are threatened
under color of state law. The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected requiring
Section 1983 plaintiffs to exhaust state remedies, see, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167, 183 (1961) (“The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the
latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.”); see
also McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 672 (1963), and the prudential
ripeness doctrine provides no basis for doing so.
10
3

Case: 21-15869, 03/30/2022, ID: 12409420, DktEntry: 57, Page 17 of 48

public office, because that critique is unquestionably protected by the First
Amendment. So too here. Twitter plausibly alleged that AG Paxton selected it for
investigation because of its fully protected speech—its decision to suspend Trump’s
account. Permitting the victim of such retaliation to seek immediate relief in federal
court neither casts doubt on nor inhibits legitimately predicated investigations.
B.

The Panel Unnecessarily And Incorrectly Resolved An Important
First Amendment Question Not Decided Below

The Panel further erred when it summarily concluded that statements by
content moderators about the neutrality of their moderation policies are ordinary
commercial speech that may be investigated for falsity “just like the statements of
any other business.” Op. 13.
First, it was improper to reach this question. Whether or to what extent
Twitter’s past general statements about content moderation are protected speech
under the First Amendment was neither necessary to the Panel’s decision nor
addressed below. See Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 575 (9th Cir. 1991) (seeing “no
reason to decide ab initio issues that the district court has not had an opportunity to
consider”); Shouse v. Pierce Cty., 559 F.2d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 1977) (concluding
it would be “premature” to resolve a constitutional question not decided below).
On an appeal arising out of a motion to dismiss, the Panel was required to
accept as true Twitter’s more than plausible allegation that displeasure with
Twitter’s editorial decision to suspend Trump’s account triggered AG Paxton to
11
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launch his investigation. The relevant First Amendment question, therefore, is
whether that editorial decision was constitutionally protected, not whether Twitter’s
statements about its neutrality in making moderation decisions were also
constitutionally protected.
Even if one accepted the Panel’s mistaken premise that the viability of
Twitter’s retaliation claim turns on whether AG Paxton could lawfully punish
Twitter for making false statements about political neutrality in its content
moderation, the Panel still did not need to decide now whether and to what extent
the First Amendment protects such statements. Rather, for prudential ripeness
purposes, it would have sufficed for the Panel to find that such statements might
violate the law, depending on how the facts developed. There was no need (or basis)
to hold—in advance of any analysis of the facts—that Twitter’s statements about
political neutrality in content moderation should be judged on the same standards
applicable to ordinary advertisements of a commercial enterprise selling widgets,
rather than one distributing and moderating news and information.
Second, having needlessly chosen to decide the extent of First Amendment
protection for Twitter’s statements about the political neutrality of its content
moderation, the Panel failed to apply the settled test for determining whether
whatever statements of Twitter are at issue fit within the category of commercial
speech. Commercial speech is speech related “solely to the economic interests of
12

Case: 21-15869, 03/30/2022, ID: 12409420, DktEntry: 57, Page 19 of 48

the speaker and its audience.” Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). Applying that test requires looking at
the specific statements at issue and evaluating their context.
The Panel did neither. Instead, it concluded that Twitter’s statements about
neutrality were “just like the statements of any other business” without identifying
any particular statements at issue, much less evaluating their context. See Op. 10
(describing the statements generally as “misrepresentations about content
moderation policies”), 11 (repeatedly referring to “Twitter’s statements” in the
collective), 13 (describing at issue Twitter’s “statements about content moderation
(that it moderates content without considering viewpoint)”), 13 (stating generally
that Twitter “has made statements about balance”). That failure is especially glaring
since none of the statements identified by AG Paxton either was made to consumers
or proposed a commercial transaction.
Third, the Panel contravened binding precedent, because the statements about
neutrality AG Paxton identified—statements Twitter allegedly made over the years
to Congress and the press, SER34-111—are no different than statements this Court
has already held are not actionable as “false or misleading representation[s] of fact.”
Prager, 951 F.3d at 999-1000.
Prager assessed whether statements about content-moderation policies made
by YouTube were actionable misrepresentations under the Lanham Act. The
13
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statements at issue there included YouTube’s public representations that it uses
“neutral” content-based filtering to regulate videos under which the “same standards
apply to all” and no content will be restricted because of a user’s viewpoint,
perspective, or identity. ER197, Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 18-15712 (9th
Cir. Aug. 23, 2018). They also included testimony of a YouTube executive before
Congress stating that YouTube’s editorial practices conform to viewpoint neutral
content-based regulations. Id. at ER110-112.
Thus, YouTube “made statements about balance,” Op. 13, related to its
content-moderation policies and practices, which are materially similar to the kinds
of statements AG Paxton pointed to when alleging he was investigating Twitter’s
representations about the neutrality of its content-moderation policies. Nevertheless,
Prager categorically held that such “lofty statements” about content-moderation
were “impervious to being quantifiable,” and thus were non-actionable “puffery.”
951 F.3d at 1000.
The Panel ignored Prager entirely. The Panel instead summarily concluded
that Twitter’s statements are potentially actionable because while on the one hand
“[n]o one believes that the New York Times literally prints ‘all the news that’s fit to
print,” a “reasonable person could think that Twitter’s statements about contentmoderation were true.” Op. 14. In support of that sweeping determination, the Panel
pointed only to Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1073–1074 (9th Cir. 2005). But
14
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that inapposite defamation case concluded only that allegedly defamatory statements
published on a “lighthearted, jocular” website could not be believed as statements of
fact by a reasonable person.

Id. at 1077. Knievel’s holding that inherently

unbelievable statements are not actionable defamation does not imply that any
“believable” statement may be the subject of a government investigation on the same
standard applicable to commercial speech. And unlike Prager, Knievel had nothing
to do with a content distributor’s self-characterizations of its editorial policies as
viewpoint neutral or the dangers of aggrieved politicians launching investigations
into the accuracy of such statements.
Fourth, the Panel failed to give appropriate weight to Supreme Court
jurisprudence holding that the editorial decision-making of distributors of news and
information are at the very core of what the First Amendment protects. Miami
Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257-258 (1974); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S.
439 (1991). That jurisprudence counsels against permitting government officials to
investigate generalized statements of news and information disseminators about
their editorial policies on the same basis as ordinary commercial speech. Licensing
investigations of statements about editorial neutrality on the same predicate as
investigations about ordinary advertising would inevitably impinge on the
constitutionally-guaranteed freedom to make such editorial decisions.
15
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If left intact, the Panel’s ruling on this point threatens to open the flood-gates
to governmental investigations probing not only the general statements of
information disseminators about their editorial policies and practices, but also each
and every particular editorial decision that any investigator might want to test as
potentially out-of-line with one of those general statements. This would inevitably
encourage law-enforcement officials to delve into, scrutinize, and potentially impose
punishments for particular editorial decisions—like Twitter’s protected choice to
remove particular messages or speakers from its platform—even though such
decision-making enjoys the fullest of First Amendment protections. See, e.g.,
Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257-258; Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559. Thus, by assuming that a
content-moderator’s general statements about its editorial policies are no different
than any ordinary commercial speech, the Panel’s decision could effectively
authorize regulating indirectly what the First Amendment prohibits regulating
directly—be it the publication decisions of a bookstore, newspaper, cable-news
channel, scientific journal, independent magazine, or website.
II.

The Prudential Ripeness Doctrine Was Not Reached By The District
Court, Was Waived By AG Paxton, And Is Dubious Under Recent
Supreme Court Precedent
Rehearing is particularly appropriate because the errors described above result

from application of a doctrine—prudential ripeness—that AG Paxton did not raise
as a basis for dismissal and that the district court did not consider. This Court
16
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ordinarily does not reach issues that were neither decided below nor fully briefed.
See, e.g., Warmenhoven v. NetApp, Inc., 13 F.4th 717, 729 (9th Cir. 2021); see also
ASSE Int’l, Inc. v. Kerry, 803 F.3d 1059, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015). As the Supreme
Court recently explained, courts “do not, or should not, sally forth each day looking
for wrongs to right,” and instead “wait for cases to come to [them], … normally
decid[ing] only questions presented by the parties.” United States v. SinenengSmith, 140 S. Ct. 1575, 1579 (2020). This case well illustrates why: the Panel failed
to consider important issues that cast doubt on its conclusions.
First, without any discussion, the Panel assumed the answer to a question that
the Supreme Court has expressly left open and that appears to have never been
decided by this Court: whether prudential ripeness can be waived. Stolt-Nielsen S.A.
v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 670 n.2 (2010) (expressing “no view” on
whether “a federal court may consider a question of prudential ripeness on its own
motion”). Neither party briefed waiver, since it did not become pertinent until the
Panel chose to decide the appeal on an argument never raised by AG Paxton. And
the doctrine’s focus on whether and to what extent adjudicating a claim now will
unduly burden the defendant, see Op. 12-13, strongly suggests that the defendant’s
failure to invoke the doctrine should constitute waiver.
Second, and more fundamentally, the Supreme Court has called into question
the entire doctrine of prudential ripeness. As this Court explained in Skyline
17
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Wesleyan Church v. California Dep’t of Managed Health Care, “[i]n Susan B.
Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014), the Supreme Court ‘cast doubt on
the prudential component of ripeness,’ identifying prudential ripeness as ‘in some
tension’ with ‘the principle that a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide cases
within its jurisdiction is virtually unflagging.’” 968 F.3d 738, 751 (9th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Clark v. City of Seattle, 899 F.3d 802, 809 n.4 (9th Cir. 2018)); accord
Safer Chemicals, Healthy Fams. v. EPA, 943 F.3d 397, 412 (9th Cir. 2019).
While the Panel was bound by the Ninth Circuit authority cited above
(predating and including Skyline) that affirmed the validity of the prudential ripeness
doctrine, the en banc Court is not. It could very well consider whether, in light of
the Supreme Court’s pointed questioning of the continued viability of the doctrine,
prudential ripeness can provide the basis for dismissal of a case that is within the
federal courts’ Article III jurisdiction. United States v. Hernandez-Estrada, 749
F.3d 1154, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming that the en banc court has authority
to decide questions first presented in a petition for rehearing). In any event, the
“uncertainty about [the] life expectancy” of the prudential ripeness doctrine makes
it an especially poor grounds on which to base a decision in this case, particularly
because AG Paxton did not raise it either below or on appeal. Skyline, 968 F.3d at
751 n.9. Indeed, that the doctrine could be applied to prevent plaintiffs from
vindicating their constitutional rights itself militates in favor of en banc review.
18
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CONCLUSION
The panel opinion conflicts with decisions of this Court and others on
exceptionally important constitutional questions. If left in place, it would deprive
First Amendment retaliation victims of a federal remedy and force them to suffer
additional constitutional harms before seeking relief. The Court should grant the
petition.
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FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TWITTER, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,
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KEN PAXTON, in his official capacity
as Attorney General of Texas,
Defendant-Appellee.
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D.C. No.
3:21-cv-01644MMC
OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Maxine M. Chesney, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted January 10, 2022
San Francisco, California
Filed March 2, 2022
Before: Mark J. Bennett, Ryan D. Nelson, and
Patrick J. Bumatay, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge R. Nelson
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TWITTER V. PAXTON
SUMMARY *
Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s order dismissing,
on ripeness grounds, an action brought by Twitter against
Ken Paxton, the Attorney General of Texas, in his official
capacity, alleging First Amendment retaliation.
After the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021,
Twitter banned President Donald Trump for life. Soon after
Twitter announced the ban, the Texas Office of the Attorney
General (OAG) served Twitter with a Civil Investigative
Demand (CID) asking it to produce various documents
relating to its content moderation decisions. Twitter sued
Paxton, in his official capacity, in the Northern District of
California, arguing that the CID was government retaliation
for speech protected by the First Amendment. Twitter asked
the district court to enjoin Paxton from enforcing the CID
and from continuing his investigation, and to declare the
investigation unconstitutional.
The panel held that this case was not prudentially ripe.
The issues were not yet fit for judicial decision because OAG
has not yet made an allegation against Twitter, because the
facts were not yet developed, and because Twitter need not
comply with the CID, could challenge it if it was enforced,
and could have challenged the CID in Texas state court, Tex.
Bus. & Com. Code § 17.61(g). While Twitter could suffer
hardship from withholding court consideration, adjudicating
this case now would require determining whether Twitter
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It
has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
*
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has violated Texas’s unfair trade practices law before OAG
has a chance to complete its investigation. Any hardship to
Twitter from the alleged chill of its First Amendment rights
was insufficient to overcome the uncertainty of the legal
issue presented in the case in its current posture.
COUNSEL
Peter G. Neiman (argued), Alex W. Miller, and Rishita
Apsani, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, New
York, New York; Mark D. Flanagan, Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Palo Alto, California; Patrick
J. Carome, Ari Holtzblatt, Anuradha Sivaram, and Susan
Pelletier, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP,
Washington, D.C.; for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Michael Kenneth Johnson
Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Walnut Creek,
California
Lanora C. Pettit (argued), Principal Deputy Solicitor
General; Benjamin D. Wilson, Deputy Solicitor General;
Judd E. Stone II, Solicitor General; William T. Thompson,
Deputy Chief, Special Litigation Unit; Patrick Sweeten,
Chief, Special Litigation Unit; Brent Webster, First
Assistant Attorney General; Ken Paxton, Attorney General;
Office of the Attorney General, Austin, Texas; for
Defendant-Appellee.
Katie Townsend, Bruce D. Brown, Gabe Rottman, and
Mailyn Fidler, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
Press, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press and Media Law
Resource Center.
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Caitlin Vogus, Samir Jain, and Emma Llansó, Center for
Democracy & Technology, Washington, D.C., for Amici
Curiae Center for Democracy & Technology, Electronic
Frontier Foundation, Media Coalition Foundation Inc.,
National Coalition Against Censorship, Pen America, and
R Street Institute.
OPINION
R. NELSON, Circuit Judge:
After the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021,
Twitter banned President Donald Trump for life. Soon after
Twitter announced the ban, the Texas Office of the Attorney
General (OAG) served Twitter with a Civil Investigative
Demand (CID) asking it to produce various documents
relating to its content moderation decisions. Twitter sued
Ken Paxton, the Attorney General of Texas, in his official
capacity, arguing that the CID was government retaliation
for speech protected by the First Amendment. The district
court dismissed the case as not ripe. We affirm.
I
A
OAG says that it has been investigating Twitter’s
content-moderation decisions in response to citizen
complaints since 2018. Twitter executives have said
publicly that Twitter does not moderate content based on
political viewpoint. After Twitter banned President Trump
for life, Paxton tweeted that Twitter (along with Facebook)
was “closing conservative accounts,” and that it and other
companies stood “ready/willing to be the left’s Chinese-style
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thought police.” He vowed that “[a]s AG, I will fight them
with all I’ve got.”
A few days later OAG served Twitter with a CID,
requiring it to produce various documents related to its
content moderation decisions. Paxton says that OAG “does
not seek to investigate the content-moderation decisions that
Twitter makes—and could not do so under [Texas’s unfair
and deceptive trade practices law]—but rather is conducting
an investigation into whether Twitter truthfully represents its
moderation policies to Texas consumers.” But Twitter
paints this rationale as a pretext for Paxton’s unlawful
retaliation.
B
After some negotiation, rather than respond to the CID
or wait for OAG to move to enforce it in Texas state court,
Twitter instead sued Paxton in the Northern District of
California. It alleged that both the act of sending the CID
and the entire investigation were unlawful retaliation for its
protected speech. Claiming under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that
Paxton violated its First Amendment rights, Twitter asked
the district court to enjoin Paxton from enforcing the CID
and from continuing his investigation, and to declare the
investigation unconstitutional. In Twitter’s view, its content
moderation decisions are protected speech because it is a
publisher, and it has a First Amendment right to choose what
content to publish. Pointing to Paxton’s public comments,
Twitter argues that the CID was served in retaliation for its
protected speech and that it chills Twitter’s exercise of its
First Amendment rights.
In response, Paxton contested personal jurisdiction,
venue, ripeness, and whether Twitter had stated a claim. On
ripeness, he argued that under Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S.
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440 (1964), pre-enforcement challenges to non-selfexecuting document requests are not ripe. Twitter countered
that the case was ripe because it had already suffered a real
First Amendment injury—its speech was already being
chilled. The district court held that it had personal
jurisdiction and that venue was proper, and then dismissed
the case as not ripe, relying on Reisman. It did not reach
whether Twitter stated a claim.
After the district court dismissed the case, Twitter moved
for an injunction pending appeal, arguing again that the case
was ripe. The district court declined to issue one, relying on
the same reasoning as before. Twitter then appealed that
order to this Court, and a divided motions panel affirmed.
Twitter now appeals the district court’s original order
dismissing the case.
II
The district court’s decision to dismiss a case for lack of
ripeness is reviewed de novo. Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d
1045, 1053 (9th Cir. 2010). The district court’s decision
may be affirmed on any ground supported by the record,
even if not relied on by the district court. Cassirer v.
Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 862 F.3d 951, 974
(9th Cir. 2017).
III
A
1
Along with standing and mootness, ripeness is one of
three justiciability requirements. Ripeness “is ‘drawn both
from Article III limitations on judicial power and from
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prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.’”
Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 10 F.4th 937, 944 (9th
Cir. 2021) (citing Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of
Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003)). The “basic rationale” of
the ripeness requirement is “to prevent the courts, through
avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements.” Portman v. Cnty. of
Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing
Abbott Lab’ys. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967)).
We have separated out the constitutional and prudential
components of ripeness. “[T]he constitutional component of
ripeness is synonymous with the injury-in-fact prong of the
standing inquiry.” Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. Getman,
328 F.3d 1088, 1094 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Thomas v.
Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th
Cir. 2000) (en banc)). The question is thus “whether the
issues presented are definite and concrete, not hypothetical
or abstract.” Id. (cleaned up).
The prudential part of ripeness, on the other hand,
requires us to “evaluate both the fitness of the issues for
judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of
withholding court consideration.”
Ass’n of Irritated
Residents, 10 F.4th at 944 (citing Abbott Lab’ys, 387 U.S.
at 149). 1 “A claim is fit for decision if the issues raised are
primarily legal, do not require further factual development,
The Supreme Court has questioned the continued validity of the
prudential ripeness doctrine because it “is in some tension with [the
Court’s] recent reaffirmation of the principle that ‘a federal court’s
obligation to hear and decide’ cases within its jurisdiction ‘is virtually
unflagging.’” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 167
(2014) (citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
572 U.S. 118, 126 (2014)). But the parties do not ask us to revisit our
precedents, and we continue to be bound by them.
1
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and the challenged action is final.” Skyline Wesleyan
Church v. Cal. Dep’t of Managed Health Care, 968 F.3d
738, 752 (9th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). On the hardship
prong, we consider whether the action “requires an
immediate and significant change in the plaintiffs’ conduct
of their affairs with serious penalties attached to
noncompliance.” Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109,
1126 (9th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). As part of this prong, we
have also considered the hardship to the government from
moving forward with the case. See Thomas, 220 F.3d
at 1142 (“the State and the City would suffer hardship were
we to adjudicate this case now.”). Even if there is some
hardship to the plaintiff from withholding consideration, that
hardship may still be “insufficient to overcome the
uncertainty of the legal issue presented in the case in its
current posture” and thus “fail[] . . . [to] outweigh[] our and
the [government’s] interest in delaying review.” Colwell v.
Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 558 F.3d 1112, 1129 (9th
Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
We have noted that we “appl[y] the requirements of
ripeness and standing less stringently in the context of First
Amendment claims.” Wolfson, 616 F.3d at 1058 (citing
Getman, 328 F.3d at 1094). But that observation relied on a
standing case, Getman, and thus relates mainly to the
constitutional ripeness of a pre-enforcement suit, not to
prudential ripeness. And we have also held that “[t]he
prudential considerations of ripeness are amplified where
constitutional issues are concerned.” Scott v. Pasadena
Unified Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 646, 662 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90–91
(1947)).
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2
Personal jurisdiction and constitutional ripeness are
jurisdictional prerequisites. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil
Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999); In re Coleman, 560 F.3d
1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 2009). We “generally may not rule on
the merits of a case without first determining that [we] ha[ve]
jurisdiction.” Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping
Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430–31 (2007) (citing Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93–102 (1998)).
But “there is no mandatory sequencing of nonmerits issues,”
and we thus “ha[ve] leeway ‘to choose among threshold
grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.’” Id.
(citing Ruhrgas, 526 U.S. at 584–85). The rationale for this
rule is that “jurisdiction is vital only if the court proposes to
issue a judgment on the merits.” Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v.
Washington, 8 F.4th 853, 861 (9th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).
Thus when jurisdictional issues would be “difficult to
determine,” we may instead dismiss a case on a non-merits
threshold ground, if doing so is “the less burdensome
course.” Id. (quoting Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 436).
B
Prudential ripeness is a non-merits threshold issue, and
personal jurisdiction and constitutional ripeness would be
difficult to determine here. We thus instead dismiss the case
on prudential ripeness, the “less burdensome course.” See
id.
This case is not prudentially ripe. The issues are not yet
fit for judicial decision because OAG has not yet made an
allegation against Twitter, because the facts are not yet
developed, and because Twitter need not comply with the
CID, can challenge it if it is enforced, and could have
challenged the CID in Texas state court, Tex. Bus. & Com.
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Code § 17.61(g). While Twitter could suffer hardship from
withholding consideration, adjudicating this case now would
require determining whether Twitter has violated Texas’s
unfair trade practices law before OAG has a chance to
complete its investigation. Any hardship to Twitter from the
alleged chill of its First Amendment rights is “insufficient to
overcome the uncertainty of the legal issue presented in the
case in its current posture.” Colwell, 558 F.3d at 1129.
1
On the first prong, whether the issues are fit for judicial
decision, Twitter argues that its claim “is based entirely on
acts that have already occurred,” and thus that prudential
ripeness is satisfied. We disagree. As Twitter argues, the
case turns on whether Paxton caused OAG to issue the CID
with a retaliatory motive. But it turns on other questions too,
and it’s as to those other questions that the issues are not yet
fit for judicial decision.
If this lawsuit is allowed to go forward, it will force OAG
to litigate its entire case on deceptive trade practices in
California without even being able to investigate it and
figure out if it wants to pursue it or not. Here’s how: The
elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim are (1) that
the plaintiff was “engaged in a constitutionally protected
activity,” (2) that the “Defendants’ actions would chill a
person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in the
protected activity,” and (3) that “the protected activity was a
substantial or motivating factor in Defendants’ conduct.”
Sampson v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 974 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th
Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Even if content moderation is
protected speech, making misrepresentations about content
moderation policies is not. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772
(1976) (misleading commercial speech is not protected). If
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Twitter’s statements are protected commercial speech, then
OAG’s investigation would be unlawful if it would chill a
person of ordinary firmness from speaking, and if it was
caused in substantial or motivating part by Twitter’s content
moderation decisions. Sampson, 974 F.3d at 1019 (citation
omitted). But if Twitter’s statements are misleading
commercial speech, and thus unprotected, then Twitter’s
content moderation decisions would be a proper cause for
the investigation, because they would be the very acts that
make its speech misleading.
In this way, addressing Twitter’s claim would require the
district court to determine whether Twitter had made
misrepresentations. But misrepresentations are exactly what
are prohibited by Texas’s unfair and deceptive trade
practices law; this is the very thing that Paxton claims OAG
is trying to investigate. And at this stage, OAG hasn’t even
alleged that there is a violation; OAG is just trying to look
into it.
Whether Twitter’s statements were
misrepresentations is not solely a legal issue because it
depends on “further factual amplification.” United States v.
Lazarenko, 476 F.3d 642, 652 (9th Cir. 2007). Allowing this
case to go forward would force OAG to litigate the merits in
a defensive posture in a different jurisdiction, without being
able to investigate its own potential claims.
Indeed, allowing this case to go forward would limit
many legitimate investigations, because they could chill
First Amendment rights.
Consider a civil antitrust
investigation. Are the business executives legitimate
targets? Or are their First Amendment rights to speak freely
among themselves being chilled? If this case were ripe, then
the target of an antitrust investigation could sue the
government and force it to try its entire case before it even
decides whether it wants to allege a violation.
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In addressing a related but separate issue, the Supreme
Court avoided this very outcome, observing that it “would
require federal courts to determine the constitutionality of
state laws in hypothetical situations where it is not even clear
the State itself would consider its law applicable.” Morales
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 382 (1992).
Finding this case ripe would require federal courts in
California to determine the constitutionality of Texas’s
unfair trade practices law in a hypothetical situation, before
Texas has even decided whether its law applies.
2
Withholding consideration could lead to some hardship
for Twitter: the alleged chill of its First Amendment rights.
But on the hardship prong, we also consider “whether the
[state] action requires immediate compliance with its terms.”
Skyline, 968 F.3d at 752. Twitter has alleged a chill on its
First Amendment rights. But because Twitter need not
comply with the CID, OAG has taken no action that requires
immediate compliance.
Moreover, any hardship to Twitter is minimized because
Twitter may still raise its First Amendment claims before
OAG brings an unfair trade practices suit. If OAG moves to
enforce the CID, Twitter can raise its First Amendment
claims at that time, before any duty to comply applies, and
without facing any charges under the underlying Texas
unfair business practices statute. Twitter also could have
challenged the CID in Texas state court. Tex. Bus. & Com.
Code § 17.61(g).
And we can also consider the hardship to OAG. See
Thomas, 220 F.3d at 1141–42 (assessing hardship to the
government from finding case ripe). Allowing this case to
go forward would force OAG to litigate its case in federal
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court in California, without being able to first investigate its
own potential claims. That would undermine Texas’s state
sovereignty. States can investigate whether businesses make
misrepresentations. Finding this case ripe would make some
of those investigations impossible.
Thus any “hardship [to Twitter] is insufficient to
overcome the uncertainty of the legal issue presented in the
case in its current posture,” and “fail[s] . . . [to] outweigh[]
our and the [Attorney General’s] interest in delaying
review.” Colwell, 558 F.3d at 1129 (citation omitted).
C
1
Twitter argues that OAG’s investigation is illegitimate
because matters of “editorial judgment” can never be
investigated. In doing so, it analogizes its statements about
content moderation (that it moderates content without
considering viewpoint) to the slogans like “all the news
that’s fit to print” and “fair and balanced.” Twitter and amici
also rely on cases highlighting the dangers in “government
editorial oversight.” See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974); Bullfrog Films, Inc. v.
Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 510 (9th Cir. 1988).
We reject these arguments. First, Bullfrog Films and
Miami Herald addressed government regulations or statutes
which themselves required balance. 847 F.2d at 505 (federal
regulations); 418 U.S. at 244 (state statute). Here, by
contrast, Twitter has made statements about balance, and so
the danger from Bullfrog Films and Miami Herald is absent.
Twitter’s statements can be investigated as misleading just
like the statements of any other business.
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Second, Twitter’s analogy to “all the news that’s fit to
print” is a puffery argument, the essence of which is that no
one would understand its statements about content
moderation to be literally true. We disagree. No one
believes that the New York Times literally prints “all the
news that’s fit to print,” but a reasonable person could think
that Twitter’s statements about content moderation were
true. Cf. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1073–74 (9th Cir.
2005) (deciding whether allegedly defamatory statement
could be believed by a reasonable person).
2
Twitter also relies on a series of First Amendment cases
to argue that “even informal threats of legal sanction, when
used as a means to punish or restrict a person’s exercise of
First Amendment rights, create an immediate First
Amendment injury that courts may remedy.” See, e.g.,
Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). Paxton
responds that those cases are “generalized First Amendment
principles” that don’t apply here and largely don’t discuss
ripeness at all. It’s true that some of these cases don’t discuss
ripeness. And regardless, a closer look at them shows that
they don’t support finding ripeness here. We first discuss
Twitter’s foundational case, Bantam Books, and then address
our precedents.
a
Bantam Books was different from this case in three ways:
it dealt with obscenity, it addressed a state regulatory scheme
that “provide[d] no safeguards whatever against the
suppression of nonobscene, and therefore constitutionally
protected, matter,” 372 U.S. at 70, and it did not address
ripeness.
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The threat to speech in Bantam Books came from the
“Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in
Youth,” a state regulatory body whose mission was to
“educate the public concerning any book, picture, pamphlet,
ballad, printed paper or other thing containing obscene,
indecent or impure language, or manifestly tending to the
corruption of the youth.” Id. at 59. The Commission
contacted distributors of these books, told them that the
books were objectionable, thanked them in advance for their
cooperation, reminded them that the Commission
recommended “purveyors of obscenity” for prosecution, and
told them that copies had been forwarded to local police
departments. Id. at 61–63. Several publishers sued, and the
Supreme Court held that the Commission’s acts violated the
First Amendment.
The Court’s holding was rooted in the complexity of its
obscenity jurisprudence. It first pointed out that although
obscenity is not protected speech, state regulation of
obscenity also is subject to “an important qualification,”
which is that the test for obscenity is complex and requires
safeguards in its application. Id. at 65 (citing Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957)). The problem with the
Commission was that it had no safeguards at all: There was
no judicial review of the notices, no notice and hearing, and
it levied vague and uninformative allegations. Id. at 70–71.
It was these faults that led the Supreme Court to say that
“[t]he procedures of the Commission are radically deficient”
and to call them a “system of informal censorship.” Id. at 71.
Bantam Books differs from this case. First, unlike
obscenity, the test for misleading or untruthful commercial
speech contains no analogous complexities or qualifications.
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772.
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Second, unlike the Commission, OAG has not alleged
that the law has been broken; it has started an investigation
and requested documents. Even a statement like “I’ll fight
them with all I’ve got” is not an allegation that Texas’s law
has been violated.
Third, unlike the Commission’s, OAG’s actions come
with procedural safeguards: If OAG moves to enforce the
CID, Twitter can raise its First Amendment defense then,
before there are any underlying charges. Twitter also could
have challenged the CID in Texas state court. Tex. Bus. &
Com. Code § 17.61(g). In Bantam Books, there were no
such opportunities.
Ultimately, in Bantam Books, the Supreme Court
“look[ed] through forms to the substance” and found that the
Commission was just a “system of informal censorship.” Id.
at 67, 71. OAG’s investigation is not a system of informal
censorship. Bantam Books does not support finding ripeness
here.
b
Along with Bantam Books, Twitter relies on several of
our cases from the last few decades. Some of these cases
don’t address ripeness at all, and others involve facts that are
very different from this case.
Twitter cites White v. Lee to argue that “retaliatory
investigations can inflict First Amendment injuries by
chilling speech.” 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000). And
it’s true that White held that a retaliatory investigation
violated the targets’ First Amendment rights. 227 F.3d
at 1228. But the case doesn’t address ripeness at all. And
even more to the point, in White, the entire investigation had
already taken place: The government investigated for several
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months and “ultimately concluded that no violation had
occurred and that the [plaintiffs] had engaged solely in
activity protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 1220.
Only at that point did the plaintiffs file a § 1983 suit. White
thus says little about this case, in which the investigation is
still ongoing.
There is another difference: In White, the plaintiffs
would have had no opportunity to challenge any aspect of
the investigation until formal charges were brought, at which
point they could have faced a large fine. Id. at 1222. But
here, as the district court pointed out, “Twitter faces no such
consequence” because it can raise its First Amendment
defense if Paxton moves to enforce the CID. 2
Wolfson also doesn’t apply. 616 F.3d at 1058. One
claim in Wolfson was prudentially ripe because it was
“primarily legal and d[id] not require substantial further
factual development.” Id. at 1060. Here, by contrast,
Twitter’s claim involves determining whether it has
misrepresented its content moderation policies. That
question requires more factual development; indeed,
developing those facts is the very subject of OAG’s
investigation. In Wolfson, there was no investigation. 3

2
As the district court pointed out, Lacey v. Maricopa County,
693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012), and Sampson, 974 F.3d at 1019, do not
apply for the same reason. In Lacey, the prosecuting attorney had
authorized the plaintiffs’ arrest, 693 F.3d at 922–23, and in Sampson, the
plaintiff was threatened with a loss of custody of a child, 974 F.3d 1020–
21. Because Twitter can raise its First Amendment challenge in an action
by OAG to enforce the CID, it faces no such consequences.

Ariz. Right to Life, 320 F.3d at 1002, similarly does not apply for
this reason. In that case, there was no investigation, and the plaintiffs
3
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Finally, Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2009),
doesn’t apply because it arose in a very different context.
Brodheim addressed neither standing nor ripeness. And it
concerned a state prison official’s alleged retaliatory threat
against a state prisoner. Id. The case does not apply because
its rule was rooted in the disparity in power and control
between prison officials and inmates, and such a disparity is
not present here.
In Brodheim, in response to an inmate’s administrative
complaint, a prison official told the inmate, “I’d also like to
warn you to be careful what you write, req[u]est on this
form.” Id. at 1266 (alteration in original). A non-selfexecuting CID that can be challenged when enforced (and
could have been challenged before enforcement) does not
create the same threat of further sanctions as this prison
official’s alleged threat.
3
For his part, Paxton asks us to find this case unripe by
relying on Reisman, 375 U.S. 440. We decline to do so.
Reisman doesn’t apply for a simple reason: It’s not about the
First Amendment and it’s not about ripeness.
In Reisman, the IRS served a married couple’s
accountants with a document request. 375 U.S. at 443. The
couple’s lawyer sued, arguing that the accountants might
comply and that their compliance would violate the attorneyclient privilege. Id. at 442. He also argued that the request
was an unreasonable seizure and that it violated his clients’
alleged a desire to engage in conduct likely prohibited. That case also
only addressed standing, and thus did not address prudential ripeness at
all.
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rights against self-incrimination. Id. The Supreme Court
dismissed the case, but not because it was unripe. Rather,
the Court dismissed the case for “want of equity.” Id. at 443.
Because the petitioners could challenge the document
request “on any appropriate ground,” the Court held that they
had “an adequate remedy at law” and thus dismissed the
case. Id. at 443, 449.
This case is different from Reisman because it involves
the First Amendment, under which a chilling effect on
speech can itself be the harm. Wolfson, 616 F.3d at 1059
(citing Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 393
(1988)). The key to the holding in Reisman was that there
had not yet been an injury: The Court held that the remedy
specified by Congress (to challenge the document request)
“suffer[ed] no constitutional invalidity.” Reisman, 375 U.S.
at 450. In other words, the injury in Reisman would only
occur if the document request were satisfied. The Court
dismissed the case because there was a way for the
petitioners to avoid any potential injury while following the
statutory process. That’s not the case here. Twitter has
alleged that its injury has already occurred; there is no way
for it to avoid its alleged injury by challenging the document
request later. (Of course, whether that injury is sufficient for
standing and constitutional ripeness is a separate issue, and
one that we decline to address, as discussed above.) Reisman
also isn’t about ripeness: Indeed, it doesn’t mention ripeness
at all. 4

Zimmer v. Connett, 640 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1981), does not apply
for the same reason. That case also concerned a document request from
the IRS to a taxpayer, and we dismissed the case “[b]ecause the taxpayer
had an adequate remedy at law.” Id. at 209.
4
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Because our analysis is rooted in prudential ripeness and
not equitable principles, it is not affected by Twitter’s
declaratory judgment claim. It’s true that “[d]eclaratory
relief may be appropriate even when injunctive relief is not.”
Olagues v. Russoniello, 770 F.2d 791, 803 (9th Cir. 1985).
But unlike the analysis of Reisman, our ripeness analysis
does not rely on the lack of an adequate remedy at law, so it
applies equally to Twitter’s claims for equitable and
declaratory relief.
IV
The issues here are not fit for judicial decision because
the facts require further development, and the relative
hardships to the parties support delaying review. The case
thus is not prudentially ripe, and the district court’s order
dismissing the case is AFFIRMED.
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